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Kant: the Duty to Promote International Peace 
and Political Intervention 
Harry Van der Linden, Indianapolis 
Kant argues that it is the duty of humanity to strive for an enduring peace 
between the nations. For Kant, political progress within each nation is essential 
to realizing lasting peace, and so one would expect him to view political inter-
vention-defined as coercive interference by one nation, or some of its citizens, 
with the affairs of another nation in order to bring about political improvements 
in that nation-as justified in some cases.! Kant, however, explicitly rejects all 
intervention by force, and some aspects of his work support an unqualified 
prohibition of political intervention. In this paper I will exarrline on which 
grounds, stated or inferred, Kant's practical philosophy upholds the absolute 
prohibition of political intervention, and conclude that, although these grounds 
are inadequate, they have the merit of pointing to important restrictions on jus-
tified political intervention. 
The Duty to Promote International Peace 
The content of this duty depends on how international peace can be real-
ized. In To Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that the emergence of republican 
states (representative democracies) is crucial for realizing peace: "[IfJ a power-
ful and enlightened people should form a republic ... , it will provide a focal 
point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to 
guarantee a state of peace among nations ... , and through several associations of 
this sort such a federation can extend further and further.,,2 Perpetual peace will 
then be realized when all nations have together formed a federation of states, 
which Kant further explicates as a union of republican states in which each 
state has abolished its standing army, voluntarily upholds the sovereignty of all 
other nations, and is hospitable to visitors who seek to trade or to exchange 
ideas. On Kant's account, republican states can function as focal points of 
peace because in these states "the consent of the citizenry is required in order to 
determine whether or not there will be war, [and] it is natural that they consider 
all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.,,3 Kant con-
tinues to argue that despotic states, to the contrary, easily go the war because 
their rulers need no public consent and usually can avoid the ravages of war . 
. More broadly, Kant holds that since republican states, unlike undemocratic 
states, allow, and even promote, the "public use of reason," they facilitate the 
moral and political enlightenment of their citizens and thus are more likely to 
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seek lasting peace.4 Granted Kant's view that democracy is a crucial contribut-
ing factor to international peace, 5 it seems to follow that the duty to promote 
peace significantly includes the duty to promote the republican ideal, both 
within one's own nation and in foreign nations. 
Kant himself explicitly draws this inference regarding the duty to promote 
the republican ideal within one's own nation, even though he severely restricts 
the stope of this duty by claiming that political change may not occur through 
resistance and revolution, but must take place through gradual reform initiated 
by existing rulers. 6 However, it is less clear whether Kant thought that we have 
a duty to promote republicanism in foreign nations for the sake of peace. He 
argues that a defeated "unjust enemy" may be required "to adopt a new consti-
tution that by its nature will be unfavorable to the inclination for war." This 
constitution is the republican constitution, and so this treatment of a defeated 
state may be seen as an instance of the duty to promote republicanism in for-
eign nations for the sake of peace.7 Kant does not provide other similar exam-
ples, but the duty can be given more Kantian content as follows. It accords with 
Kant's view that wealthy nations and their citizens have a duty to assist devel-
oping nations in their endeavor to eliminate poverty, hunger, preventable dis-
. eases, and poor education; for the elimination of these ills removes 
impediments to individual autonomy, and one aspect of the duty to respect 
other humans as ends in themselves is to promote the conditions oftheir auton-
omy.8 Improved conditions of autonomy facilitate political progress and thus 
help the cause of peace. Hence, assistance in the struggle against poverty, hun-
ger, and so forth, in developing countries may be seen as a way of satisfying the 
duty to promote republicanism in foreign nations for the sake of peace. None-
theless, Kant's ethics is too restrictive here because it supports the view that we 
may never seek to promote peace by furthering republicanism in foreign nations 
through political intervention. 
Kant's Arguments Against Political Intervention 
Preliminary Article 5 of To Perpetual Peace prohibits intervention: "No 
nation shall forcibly (gewalttdtig) interfere with the constitution and govern-
ment of another." In his explication of the Article, Kant suggests that just as 
one may not coercively interfere with the immoral conduct of a person who 
only sets a bad example, so it is wrong to coercively interfere with a foreign 
state that does not harm other states but oppresses its own people. Rather, the 
example of the oppressive government should be seen as a warning to other 
nations not to commit the same injustices. Kant adds that foreign assistance to 
one of the parties in an internal discord is justified only in the case of civil war; 
for since the parties are in a "condition of anarchy," the assistance "to one of 
the parties could not be regarded as interference by the other in its constitu-
tion.,,9 He concludes that, short of civil war, "a foreign power's interference 
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'would violate the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal 
ills. Doing this would be an obvious offense and would render the autonomy of 
every nation insecure." 
Considering the language of Preliminary Article 5 and the political condi-
tions of Kant's time, it is likely that Kant thought of intervention only in terms 
of military and other violent forms of intervention when he formulated the Ar-
ticle. Thus the Article may seem compatible with nonviolent forms of political 
intervention, such as financial support for democratic opposition parties in a 
foreign nation or trade sanctions aimed at improving its human rights record. 
The problem with this claim is that Kant's explication of the Article commits 
him to the prohibition of all intervention, including political intervention, be-
cause he maintains that the autonomy of all nations, oppressive or not, should 
be respected, just as we must respect alike the autonomy of non-harming virtu-
ous and immoral persons. For Kant, the only exception to the rule of respecting 
state autonomy is that a nation injures, or poses a threat to, other states, and 
then war may be warranted. I 0 
This argument (a), that political intervention is wrong because states are 
like moral persons with autonomy should be distinguished from Kant's imme-
diately following and final argument (b), under Preliminary Article 5, that 
adopting a policy of intervention for the sake of eliminating injustice is wrong 
because it would lead to the bad consequence of making the "autonomy of every 
nation insecure" (and, hence, lasting peace would become an illusion). Kant 
does not address intervention in any detail elsewhere in his work, and so addi-
tional arguments that he might have held against political intervention must be 
inferred from various aspects of his practical philosophy. The following three 
arguments seem to be the most significant: ( c) A central theme of Kant's ethics 
is that we must mirror the ideal of the realm of ends in our moral actions. We 
may infer that it is also his view that in working toward peace we must mirror 
the ideal of the federation of states as the political foundation of the realm of 
ends. In this federation, nonintervention is the rule, and so Kant's ethics seems 
to imply that this rule must always guide our political conduct, irrespective of 
whether intervention might at times lead to political improvements. (d) In To 
Perpetual Peace, Kant warns that political change should not be pushed too 
quickly. "Despotic moralists" make this mistake out of political inexperience 
and enthusiasm for the ideal, and, typically, the overall result is repression for 
the sake of the good and a worse political constitution. IIMoral pol iticians,lI to 
the contrary, realize that change must come gradually. I I Proponents of political 
intervention are like despotic moralists, seeking premature political change. 
They fail to realize that when people in a foreign nation are ready for change 
they can realize it by themselves, and that intervention will ultimately only 
worsen the situation. (e) Kant rejects revolution and resistance for various rea-
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sons, and, since political interv~ntion commonly involves assistance· to populat' 
resistance, it is also unjustified. 
Objections to Kant's Arguments 
Argument (a) is mistaken on Kant's own terms. Granted that it is wrong to 
coercively try to change the immoral conduct of a person who does not inflict 
harm on. you, it does not follow in analogy that all political intervention is 
wrong. The crucial point is that not all states should be viewed as moral per-
sons with autonomy. Kant claims that the state as moral person is constituted 
by the social contract. In other words, the state as moral person emerges when 
the people give up their lawless freedom in the state of nature and install the 
rule of law, expressing their united will, i.e., the will of the state as moral per-
son. This means that the state is justified, and should be viewed as a moral per-
son with autonomy, only if the state accords with the united Will. 12 Thus, the 
. more a government adopts laws and policies that cannot be seen as an expres-
sion of the united will-and, typically, this involves the more a government is 
undemocratic-the less reason there is to treat the state with this government as 
a moral person. Kant failed to draw this conclusion, perhaps because he could 
not accept its implication that most governments of his time were not legiti-
mate. At any rate, the logic of his view is that political intervention is only 
wrong with respect to republican states, or approximations thereof, and may be 
justified with regard to unjust states if it accords with the will of their people 
. struggling for democracy. 13 
Argument (b) is weak if based on the premise that it is not theoretically 
possible to articulate a principle that legitimizes political. intervention in only 
some cases. We should, therefore, assume that the point of the argument is the 
practical slippery slope: in the real world of politics, political interventions jus-
tified by a limited principle will give rise to many unjustified interventions. 
Accordingly, wise political theorists should publicly reject political intervention 
altogether, even if they hold that it may be theoretically justified in some cases. 
And wise politicians will not pursue intervention, even if they believe it justi-
fied in a given situation, fearing that it would trigger many immoral interven-
tions by other nations. 
The danger of escalation, I think, should be granted, especially when inter-
vention involves violence. However, we should not forget the very serious costs 
of an unconditional prohibition of political intervention, created by leaving op-
pressed people without any real international support. 14 These costs have tre-
mendously increased since Kant's time, as the instruments of oppression have 
become much more effective and destructive. So we must articulate a limited 
principle of political intervention, and promote a corresponding practice, that 
minimizes the risk of escalation. Some guidelines are that the intervention must 
be essential for political success; that nonviolent intervention rather than mili-
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tary intervention should be chosen where it is at all effective; that the interven-
tion should accord with the will of those on whose behalf it takes place; and 
that the intervening agent should seek support for its action within the world 
community. 
Argument (c) concerns the problem of ethical rigorism. Kant rightly con-
tends that we must uphold the ideal of the realm of ends in our moral conduct 
in the sense that we should determine our moral rules from the perspective of 
members (ideal legislators) of this realm. However, Kant at times wrongly de-
nies that in deciding how these rules should guide our conduct we should take 
into account that we are not acting in a world of ideal legislators. 1 5 Thus Kant 
arrives at his rigoristic adherence to truth-telling, as exemplified in his infa-
mous insistence that a servant may not lie about the whereabouts of his master 
to the person at the door who seeks to kill his master. This ethical rigorism is 
morally untenable even on Kant's own account; for by neglecting that one is 
confronted with evil, one may become an instrument of this evi1. This would 
violate Kant's duty of self-respect and also be contrary to his duty of mutual 
aid. 16 . 
The upshot is that it is similarly wrong to act as if all existing nations are 
like republican states in the federation of nations and thus arrive at an absolute 
prohibition of intervention. Just as we may need to lie in order to prevent great 
harm to an individual, so political intervention may be justified in order to 
counteract political oppression in a foreign nation. This does not mean, how-
ever, that we should not mirror the ideal in our conduct. Rather, in this context, 
this moral demand should be interpreted to mean that we should continue to 
strive for the ideal and not deny its moral validity through our actions. Kant's 
view in The Metaphysics oj Morals on the rules of war is instructive here. He 
does not claim that we must be unconditional pacifists, apparently rejecting the 
reasoning that led up to his rigorism concerning truth-telling. 17 A defensive 
war may be waged, but it should be waged "in accordance with principles that 
always leave open the possibility of leaving the state of nature among 
states ... and entering a rightful condition" (VI, 347/153). Wars, then, must not 
undermine the possibility of future peace. Accordingly, Kant continues to argue 
that wars may not aim at the extermination or subjugation of other people. 
Plunder is also wrong, and in support of this claim Kant makes the important 
observation that the people' do not wage war, but rather the state "through the 
people" (VI, 348/154). Last, Kant emphasizes that assassins, poisoners, snip-
ers, and the like, should not be used; for "such underhanded means ... would 
destroy the trust requisite to establish a lasting peace in the future.,,18 
In my view, political intervention should likewise aim at peace and not un-
dermine trust as the very basis of the future federation of states. This underlines 
the significance of the restrictions on justified inte~ention mentioned earlier. 
Intervention must be based on the will of the people needing outside assistance; 
--~~ ~-----~~~--~--~----- --
----------- --~- -~ --~~-~---~ -----
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it should ideally be supported by many republican nations in the world com-' 
munity; and it should be a last resort measure, especially when violence is in-
volved. More generally, intervention directed against an oppressive government 
should incorporate Kant's guideline concerning war that the target should not 
be individuals but the state as it acts through them. 19 
Argument (d) points to an additional restriction on justified political inter-
vention. It should be acknowledged that intervention may lead to premature 
change because, as the gradualist rightly claims, emancipation is a slow process 
even in revolutionary periods. So it is important that intervention in general 
aims at increased moral and political self-determination of the people on whose 
behalf it takes place. Kant, however, is often too conservative in his gradual-
ism. In the anti-revolution/resistance passages in his work, Kant assumes that 
the people are only ready for change when it is initiated and gradually pursued 
by their governments, and that any successful attempt on the side of the people 
to force change temporarily involves a state of anarchy that is worse than any 
government whatsoever. 20 Once this bleak vision of the capacity of self-
determination of the people is adopted, political intervention must always ap-
pear to be politically unwise. Kant's historical location may have prevented him , 
from seeing that popular struggles may be well-organized and disciplined. Cer-· 
tainly, external support of such struggles does not necessarily iead to premature 
change; for the people may be ready for political change and, yet, their political 
success may require intervention to counteract an otherwise too powerful op-
pressive government. 
In response to argument (e), it may first of all be noted that Kant's rejection 
of resistance and revolution does not commit him to prohibit all political inter-
vention. After all, intervention might involve support for an aspiring demo-:-
cratic government against its internal opposition. Further, although it is not my 
purpose here to examine all Kant's arguments against revolution and resistance 
in any detail, it may be noted that most of these arguments are similar to his 
objections to political intervention and involve similar weaknesses. My discus-
sion of argument (d) illustrates the point. A second example concerns Kant's 
claim that revolution and resistance are unjustified because their acceptance 
'''would render all just constitutions insecure. ,,21 This argument can be refuted 
along the same lines in which I have refuted argument (b): A defense of civil, 
'disobedience, revolution under exceptional circumstances, and so on, does nei-
ther in theory nor in practice imply the consequences foreseen by Kant. A final. 
example is Kant' sargument that revolution and resistance are self-contradic-
tory practices in that they entail that the people wish to act as judges of their 
own cause and, yet, :Q.ave given up the right to do so in the social contract. Kant 
here makes the same mistake as in argument (a), namely, that any government" 
no matter how oppressive, must be seen as an expression of the united will and; 
hence, as a moral person. 22 
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Conclusion 
Although Kant's arguments against revolution and resistance, on the one 
hand, and political intervention, on the other hand, display similar weaknesses 
in his practical philosophy, his rejection of political intervention poses lessse-
rious problems for his work. One reason for this is that political intervention is 
less essential in bringing about political progress than are revolution and resis-
tance. Another reason is that Kant might have contradicted his condemnation 
of all active resistance by predicting political progress on basis of the moral 
enthusiasm that the French Revolution created among its spectators,23 whereas 
a similar inconsistency cannot be found with regard to his rejection of inter-
vention. 
Still, Kant's proposal that we ought to seek international peace with all our 
efforts is weakened by his prohibition of political intervention. To be sure, Kant 
explicitly rejects only intervention by force, but several arguments in his work 
commit him to an unqualified rejection of political intervention. This view is 
unacceptable, especially for our own age. The greatly increased interdepend-
ence of all nations and people since Kant's time, together with the revolution-
ary developments in the means of communication and the increased effec-
tiveness and destructiveness of oppressive governments, have changed the 
political, moral, and economic significance of national boundaries, making 
political intervention more viable, urgent, diverse in its forms, and justified. 
Yet, I hope to have shown that the arguments in Kant's work against interven-
tion have the merit of pointing to important restrictions on justified political 
intervention. A final restriction needs to be mentioned. In To Perpetual Peace, 
Kant passionately condemned the practice of hiring out troops to other nations 
because the soldiers "are used and wasted as mere objects to be manipulated at 
will" (VIII, 3441108). Moreover, he argued that "paying men to kill or to be 
killed appears to use them as mere machines and tools in the hands of another 
(the nation)" (VIII, 345/108). Similar remarks apply to political interventions 
that do not accord with the free will of those who execute them. 
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